De ce fel de NATO au nevoie membri săi estici?
de Corneliu Vlad
Statelor din centrul si estul continentului care au intrat in comunitatea euroatlantica, criza ucraineana le-a pus o intrebare presanta: este sau nu Alianta pregatita sa asigure securitatea membrilor sai mai noi, li se aplica si lor “principiul muschetarilor” inscris in faimosul art. 5 al Tratatului de la Washington – Toti pentru unul, unul pentru toti? Sau, cum plastic se tot exprima presa occidentala, ar muri militarii americani sau vest-europeni pentru Tallin sau Varsovia sau Riga? Roza vanturilor, emblema de pe drapelul albastru al Aliantei, pare sa exprime grafic, in actualele circumstante, si directiile neasteptate din care statele din flancul estic al NATO receptioneaza semnale nelinistitoare. Caci nelinisti –desigur, de cu totul alta natura – vin nu numai dinspre Moscova, ci si dinspre Bruxelles si alte capitale occidentale. “Divizarile interne din NATO privind principalele probleme de securitate care afecteaza statele aflate la frontiera estica a Aliantei reprezinta o sursa de neliniste” – constata la sfarsitul lui 2014 fostul reprezentant permanent al Poloniei la NATO, prof. Jerzy M. Nowak . In sanul Aliantei, exemplifica el, se manifesta diferende legate de evaluarea amenintarilor si de cerintele in termeni de capacitate militara, de politica fata de Rusia si de misiunile din afara zonei. Un izvor de neliniste a fost, pana la un moment, pentru statele din flancul estic, si “abordarea nelinistitoare” a statelor membre riverane Mediteranei, care tindeau “sa marginalizeze” art. 5 al Tratatului de la Washington, manifestau reticente fata de proiectele de intarire a flancului estic si adoptasera “o abordare unilaterala a relatiilor NATO-Rusia, in sensul ca se concentra doar pe cooperare, neglijand elementele de rivalitate si instabilitate manifestate de “acest partener strategic exigent” care este Moscova.
Or, statele est-europene foste membre ale Tratatului de la Varsovia au intrat in NATO tocmai pentru a beneficia de o reala securitate in cadrul Aliantei, la adapost de presiuni si amenintari care ar putea veni din partea fostului lor “frate mai mare” de la Moscova
Politologul polonez, acum profesor universitar la Varsovia pleda pentru o atentie speciala a NATO fata de statele din flancul estic al Aliantei, du nu inainte insa de a enumera o serie de sfidari si amenintari de natura politica la adresa Poloniei ,dar care pot fi desigur extrapolate in mare intregii zone a flancului estic: formarea in regiune a unui sistem de forte defavorabile pentru Alianta (si Occident in general), in conditiile perioadei de tranzitie economica, fapt care indeamna Rusia sa umple vidul strategic creat de retragerea progresiva a Statelor Unite de pe continentul european; aparitia, in cadrul NATO, a unui dezechilibru in domeniul securitatii, provocat de disponibilitatea unor state occidentale de a lua in consideratie exigentele Rusiei privitoare la neinstalarea de structuri militare pe teritoriul statelor din Europa centrala si de nord si adancirea diferendelor intre statele aliate , ceea ce posate duce la paralizia organizatiei si chiar la tentative de dizolvare ; criza profunda si lipsa de consens in sanul Uniunii Europene, care franeaza nu numai cooperarea, dar si dezvoltarea unei politici comune de securitate si aparare; aparitia unor partide care se pronunta pentru un fel de neo-izolationism si care se distanteaza de NATO si UE pentru a se concentra cu prioritate pe definirea unui potential national de aparare.
In aceste conditii – si tinand seama desigur de focarul de tensiune din Ucraina care tinde sa se complice si sa se cronicizeze – “de ce fel de NATO avem nevoie?”, se intreaba fostul reprezentant al Poloniei la sediul Aliantei. Si tot el avanseaza prime raspunsuri:
1. In primul rand, trebuie asigurata buna indeplinire a art. 5. “Va trebui sa fim siguri ca in caz de agresiune ,nu numai pe teritoriul polonez, dar si pe cel al tarilor baltice, sprijinul aliat va fi automat si imediat( ppentru protejarea instalatiilor strategice, centrelor de comandament, aeroporturilor, porturilor, infrastructurii etc). Astazi – afirma fara menajamente ambasadorul polonez – persista indoieli si ne putem intreba daca, atunci cand va veni momentul, Alianta nu se va transforma intr-un coffee shop, adica in forum de discutii la nesfarsit, incapabile sa ia o decizie;
2. Alianta atlantica trebuie dotata cu capacitati suficiente de aparare, mai ales in ce priveste apararea teritoriului, mentinerea de forte de descurajare credibile si supraveghera bunei functionari a planurilor de urgenta si a planurilor de aparare in caz de amenintare a Aliantei care ar tine de art.5. Nu pot fi neglijate nici dezvoltsrea de sisteme antiracheta su antiaeriene integrate, de forte de reactie ale NATO si alte forte care ar putea fi utolizate pentru apararea teritoriului;
3. Statele Unite trebuie sa joace in continuare un rol de prim plan in cadrul Aliantei ;
4. Distinctia tacita intre membrii “vechi” si cei”noi” ai Aliantei va trebui suprimata, pentru a asigura tuturor statelor membre acelasi nivel de securitate.
5. Alianta trebuie sa aiba o politica rasariteana credibila fata de Federatia Rusa (pentru a ancora acest stat de Europa), tinand seama de specificitatea pozitiei geografice a statelor din regiune si lasand deschisa perspectiva aderarii Ucrainei, R. Moldova si Georgiei la NATO.
6. Polonia si celelalte tari din zona trebuie sa fie codecidenti ai politicii NATO, mai ales in ce priveste politica sa rasariteana.
Universitarul polonez incheie abordarea sa intransigenta asupra noilor responsabilitati ale NATO in contextul creat de criza din Ucraina apreciind ca “schimbarea strategica si antioccidentala care a avut loc in Rusia are un caracter durabil”. Context in care Alianta atlantica va trebui sa ia masuri concrete pentru intarirea securitatii si apararii statelor membre ale NATO din vecinatatea Rusiei, dar in acelasi timp “sa mentina un echilibru intre politica disuasiva fata de Moscova si posibilitatea revenirii la o cooperare cu Rusia daca aceasta va renunta la politica sa agresiva fata de Ucraina”. In orice caz, incheie autorul polonez, dupa summitul NATO 2014, statele membre din flancul estic au un sentiment de a fi mai in securitate, “desi cumva intr-o maniera inca incompleta”.
Mai in securitate… cumva…inca incompleta… Cam incerte exprimari intr-un domeniu atat de riguros cum este cel al apararii si securitatii. Oricum, fostul reprezentant polonez la NATO spera ca strategia si conceptul strategic ale Aliantei vor fi adaptate si mediului european de securitate, dar si cerintelor specifice ale statelor din flancul estic al NATO.
Sursa: Curentul via Ziaristi Online
Foto sus: REUTERS/Sergei Ilnitsky/Pool
Citiţi şi analiza Business Insider:
Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday other countries should not think they can attain military superiority over Russia, Interfax reported.
“No one should have the illusion that they can gain military superiority over Russia, put any kind of pressure on it. We will always have an adequate answer for any such adventures,” he was quoted as saying in an address dedicated to the Defenders’ of the Fatherland Day holiday next week.
“Our soldiers and officers have proven that they are ready to act decisively smoothly, professionally and courageously, to perform the most difficult non-standard tasks, as befits a modern hardened combat-ready army that protects their traditions and military duty,” according to a Business Insider translation of BBC’s report.
The bellicose statement comes as Russian-backed rebels are gaining territory in eastern Ukraine.
On Friday, Kiev accused Russia of sending more tanks and troops into eastern Ukraine and said they were heading towards the rebel-held town of Novoazovsk on the southern coast, expanding their presence on what could be the next key battlefront.
Reuters
Novoazovsk lies on the Sea of Azov, 40 km (25 miles) east of the port city of Mariupol. It was captured by rebels last year and could be a launching-pad for more pressure on Mariupol, a gateway to the south and possibly to the Crimea peninsula annexed by Russia a year ago.
“In recent days, despite the Minsk (ceasefire) agreement, military equipment and ammunition have been sighted crossing from Russia into Ukraine,” military spokesman Andriy Lysenko said.
He said more than 20 Russian tanks, 10 missile systems and busloads of troops had crossed the border into Ukraine.
Mstyslav Chernov/AP
Western nations have clung to the hope that they can revive the peace deal brokered by France and Germany in the Belarussian capital Minsk on Feb. 12 even though the rebels ignored it to seize the important railway hub of Debaltseve.
Russian actions and Putin’s words don’t bode well.
Military buildup
Moscow has made several recent moves to bolster the overall standing of the Russian military. On December 26, 2014, Putin signed off on a new military doctrine that listed NATO as Russia’s main existential rival while extolling the value of further militarization of three main spheres of forward Russian power.
The three geopolitical front lines that Russia seeks to reinforce are the Arctic region, the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad which neighbors Poland on the Baltic Sea, and the recently annexed Crimean peninsula. Moscow views each of these regions as critical for checking the expansion of NATO power while also serving as forward bases for Russian military and economic expansion.
The site of the most concerted Russian militarization effort so far has been the Polar Arctic region, which the US estimates contains upwards of 15% of the earth’s remaining oil, 30% of its natural gas, and 20% of its liquefied natural gas.
In the Arctic Russia has undertaken a construction blitz which includes the construction of 16 deepwater ports, 13 airfields, and ten air-defense radar stations along the coast.
Moscow has also created the Joint Strategic Command North, which the Polish Institute of International Affairs notes will include a naval infantry brigade, an air defense division, an Arctic mechanized brigade, and missile defense systems.
In Kaliningrad, the AP reports, Russia briefly deployed high precision mobile Iskander ballistic missiles. Simultaneously, Russia now has a major naval base, air defense missiles, and long-range bombers based in the Crimean peninsula.
As part of its massive goal of military modernization, Russia plans to construct and introduce into service 12 new ballistic missile submarines in addition to an additional eight nuclear attack submarines by the 2020s, Russian Military Reform reports.
Russia’s government-owned Krylov State Research Center also claims to be making strides toward the construction of a massive new aircraft carrier that could carry 100 planes. The carrier would complement Russia’s Admiral Kuznetsov, the country’s only carrier, which faces frequent operational problems.
However, all of this bluster belies Russia’s own dire situation. Moscow’s economy has continued to take a beating from a mixture of economic sanctions and falling oil prices, thereby constricting the country’s ability expand its military without putting significant strains on other portions of its economy.
In October, before Russia’s ruble crash, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov expressed his concern as to the government’s ability to pay finance the country’s grandiose defense plans.
“When we were adopting the defense program, the forecasts for the economy and budget revenues were completely different. Right now, we just cannot afford it,” he told Reuters.
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